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Abstract
Findings on the effect of repression on political participation are mixed and inconclusive. This article addresses this puzzle by
introducing and conceptualizing ‘responses to repression’ as individuals’ varying willingness to risk-taking and continuing with
political activities despite possible threats. We use three-wave panel survey data and focus on the run-up to the 2013 Iranian
presidential elections, during which the gradual decline in political participation of Green Movement supporters turned into a
remarkable increase in activism. The findings indicate that the decision to either refrain from or resist repression plays an
important role in explaining some forms of political participation. And, in turn, this decision to either refrain or resist is influ-
enced by social-psychological factors: Iranian Green Movement (IGM) supporters who experienced less fear, were more
aggrieved and perceived lower levels of repression than other supporters, were more inclined to embrace risks. Consequently,
they more frequently engaged in everyday forms of resistance – covert activities, which are difficult to be controlled and sur-
veilled by states. It implies that social movement supporters in repressive contexts cannot only ignore the risks associated with
activism and continue with the same activity but can also find or invent other forms of political activity to resist repression.
Policy implications
• The article demonstrates the relevance of individual agency and social movement supporters’ responses to repression for
understanding political participation in the case of severe repression.
• Mobilizing and shaping people’s perceptions of their grievances, fears and levels of repression are effective instruments to
enhance the willingness of risk-taking, and continuing with political activities despite possible threats.
• To grasp and push for democratic change, policy makers should not only focus on the most tangible disruptive protest
forms, such as street demonstrations but also acknowledge the importance of more covert everyday forms of resistance,
such as persuasion activities by movement supporters in face-to-face and online discussions.
1. Varying political participation, despite constant
repression
In the week before the 2013 Iranian presidential elections,
the Wall Street Journal reported: ‘Iran’s security officials
warned that they would crackdown on any opposition activ-
ity in the run-up to the elections. At the last two opposition
events, security forces carried out more than a dozen
arrests’ (Fassihi, 2013). Despite the hostile environment, Ira-
nian Green Movement (IGM) supporters, particularly grass-
roots and young activists, became active to support voting
for a moderate candidate (Honari, 2019; Kadivar and Abe-
dini, 2020). Their activities were so widespread and influen-
tial that the Green Movement’s revival was dubbed an
‘electoral uprising’ (Harris, 2013).
The main mantra of the mobilization campaign – ‘I vote!’
– is an adaption of four years earlier: during the sponta-
neous protests that broke out after the disputed presidential
elections in 2009, the IGM had arisen with the slogan
‘Where is my vote?’. Along with unprecedented street
demonstrations in post-revolutionary Iran, online activism
flourished, to the extent that commentators called it ‘Iran’s
Twitter Revolution’ (Iran’s Twitter Revolution, 2016).1 The
peaceful post-election protests were severely cracked down
by the government.
The IGM is an alliance of pro-democratic groups whose
supporters range from those who seek gradual changes
within the system to those who want radical change relying
on confrontational tactics. It differs from most conventional
NGOs and citizen-based groups in the sense that it has an
organic and bottom-up means of organization, and there-
fore lacks a clearly demarcated membership base. The IGM
has no hierarchical structure and formal organization with
affiliated members (Milani, 2010). As Bayat (2013) explains,
both repression and the use of social media have condi-
tioned the IGM into an ‘unstructured’, ‘leaderless’ organiza-
tion – a model of social movement activism that also
characterized the Arab uprisings in 2011.
Despite severe repression, the IGM challenged the Iranian
government for several years, through different forms of
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activities, both off- and online. But toward the end of 2012,
the activities of the Iranian Green Movement had almost
come to a halt. The two reformist candidates Mehdi Kar-
roubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi, whose votes were ‘stolen’ in
the 2009 presidential elections, have been put under house
arrest since 2011 and the boycott of the 2012 parliamentary
elections had not resulted in any tangible achievements, in
the sense that it had not revitalized the movement by unit-
ing it.
Not surprisingly, some observers claimed that the move-
ment’s demise was because of sustained state repression.2
However, in the run-up to the 2013 presidential elections,
the political activities of IGM supporters increased, despite
the unchanged level of repression. This leads to the ques-
tion of how to explain the political participation of Iranian
Green Movement supporters, or the lack thereof, under sev-
ere and constant levels of repression.
In order to better understand collective action in repres-
sive contexts, this article draws our attention to the micro-
level and individual choices. We argue that understanding
what differentiates social movement supporters who refrain
from political activities because of possible threats from
those who resist repression can help us to comprehend why
repression can have different effects on political participa-
tion. Doing so, this article, speaks to the approach that puts
individual agency at the centre of accounts for political par-
ticipation in contexts where repression matters.
Following the prevailing approach of considering activism
as being deterred by state repression, we first test the
hypothesis that IGM supporters who perceive more repres-
sion are less politically active than those who perceive less
repression. We focus on a time period when the gradual
decline in political participation of IGM supporters turned
into a remarkable increase in activism during the 2013 presi-
dential elections: February–June 2013. We find that, whereas
perceived repression among IGM supporters remained
unchanged during that period, their political participation
significantly changed. Hence, the data show that changes in
perceived repression cannot fully account for the overall
increase in political participation.
Subsequently, we scrutinize this puzzle by turning our
attention to what we call ‘responses to repression’. This con-
cept captures the notion that risk-taking varies among indi-
viduals and is shaped by social-psychological factors:
whether activists are inclined to refrain from political activi-
ties because of possible threats or rather resist repression. In
a similar vein, Ayanian and Tausch (2016) make a distinction
between perceived risks associated with activism (i.e. per-
ceived repression) and the importance people attach to
those risks (i.e. response to repression).
Interestingly, we find that IGM activists, on average, less
often refrained from political activities during the two
months preceding the elections than the two months pre-
ceding that period, while the average level of perceived
repression remained unchanged.
Therefore, in the next step, we examine what accounts
for individuals’ choices between refraining from political
activities as a response to repression and resisting
repression. We focus on four social-psychological motives of
political participation that may differentiate between individ-
uals who resist repression from those who refrain from polit-
ical activities: emotions, perceived efficacy, identity, and
grievances. Social psychologists identified these as the four
main motives fostering political engagement (van Stekelen-
burg and Klandermans, 2013).
To summarize, we generally find that while perceived
repression does not directly affect political participation, it
does influence social movement supporters’ inclination to
either refrain or resist. In turn, these varying individual
responses to repression play an important role in explaining
some forms of political participation, namely everyday forms
of resistance – covert activities, which are difficult to be con-
trolled and surveilled by states. And, in turn, this decision to
either refrain or resist is influenced by social-psychological
motivations: Iranian Green Movement supporters who expe-
rienced less fear, were more aggrieved and perceived lower
levels of repression than other supporters, were more
inclined to embrace risks.
2. Theoretical background
Findings on the effect of repression on participation are
mixed and inconclusive (For reviews, see Earl, 2011; Honari,
2018b). Some scholars concluded that repression negatively
affects political participation and silences social movements
(Boykoff, 2006; Ellefsen, 2016; Wood, 2007), whereas others
found that it enhances participation in protests (Almeida,
2008; Loveman, 1998; McAdam, 1990). Still, others argued
that the relationship between the level of repression and
political participation generally corresponds to a reversed U-
curve (Gurr, 1970; Khawaja, 1993). Scholars have made three
important points to explain the above-mentioned variation
in the effects of repression, which we will clarify in what fol-
lows.
2.1. Perceived repression
First, despite being embedded in the same repressive politi-
cal context, people have different perceptions about the
likelihood of risks associated with activism. As, for instance,
Press (2015) shows in the case of Kenya, Sierra Leone, and
Liberia, structural opportunities at the macro-level do not
necessarily explain social movement activities. Thus, to
understand the effect of repression at the individual level,
scholars pay attention to perceived repression (Kurzman,
1996). In other words, to understand how repression influ-
ences individuals’ political participation, the first step is to
scrutinize how state repression is perceived by individuals.
As Maher (2010, p. 255) explained, in repressive contexts
‘states often intentionally limit information about structural
changes’. Therefore, perceived repression at the individual
level can be unrelated to the level of state repression at the
macro level (Honari, 2018a; Kurzman, 1996). For this reason,
‘objective’ repression – what states do – should be distin-
guished from ‘subjective’ repression – what individuals per-
ceive (Kurzman, 1996; Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991).
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Moreover, perceived repression among individuals/activists
can vary (Kurzman, 1996).
Initial thoughts on perceived repression treated it as syn-
onymous with increasing costs, which would have a direct
deterrent effect on political participation (Olson, 1965).
Olson (1965) suggested that rational and self-interested indi-
viduals will (not) act to achieve the common good on the
basis of a cost-benefit calculation. Thus, in this view, which
still prevails as the conventional wisdom, (perceived) repres-
sion – as the cost of participation that outweighs its benefit
– decreases the likelihood of political participation. Accord-
ingly, we will first hypothesize a negative direct effect of
perceived repression:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of perceived repression,
the less individuals participate in political activities.
2.2. Response to repression
The second important point is that, while facing similar risks,
some people are more risk-taking than others. Surprisingly,
people’s response to repression as an independent factor
has been largely ignored in the repression scholarship. As
Jasper (2004) pointed out, the unbalanced attention for
agency of actors (state and citizens) has been in favor of
the state. In fact, repressive states are viewed as more pow-
erful and more determining actors than repressed citizens,
which is rooted in the tendency to label people under
repression as victimized people.
Our argument to include agency of citizens into the study
of repression elaborates on, among others, a notable study
of Egyptian activists during the 2013 anti-coup uprising of
Ayanian and Tausch (2016). Highlighting the subjective
importance of risk, it argued that ‘the expected likelihood of
being harmed can be distinguished from the extent to
which individuals perceive that risk is important’ (Ayanian
and Tausch, 2016, p. 704). Put differently, some people may
attach more importance to the risks associated with repres-
sion than others (Honari, 2018a). Since their study only
focuses on the particular case of Egypt, Ayanian and Tausch
(2016, p. 714) aptly stress that ‘future research should con-
sider the role of risk perceptions in different intergroup con-
texts’. Hence, we contribute to the generalizability of
previous results.
Downplaying and/or disregarding the risks of potential
threats resembles the notion of ‘individual bravery’ – the
willingness to engage in risky protest (Kurzman, 2012). We
likewise draw the attention of repression scholars to the
choice of individuals (individuals’ responses to repression)
between refraining and resisting: individuals can attempt to
manage the risk of participation and/or take these risks for
granted. We place individuals’ responses to repression –
what Ayanian and Tausch label ‘subjective importance of
risk’ – as a mediator between perceived repression and
political participation. Hence, we test the interrelationship
between perceived repression, response to repression and
political participation. This yields the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: The higher the level of perceived repression,
the less willing social movement supporters are to embrace
risks of potential threats associated with engagement in activi-
ties (i.e. they respond to repression).
Hypothesis 3: The less willing social movement supporters
are to embrace risks of potential threats, the less often they
participate in political activities.
2.3. Micro-mobilization and social-psychological factors
Third, to explain variation in the effects of repression on
participation, scholars draw attention to micro-mobilization
processes at the micro-level, which can simultaneously
decrease and increase political participation. Opp and Roehl
(1990, pp. 540–541) state that ‘depending on the strength
of repression and the extent to which micro-mobilization
processes provide positive incentives to protest, the direct
deterring effect of repression is endorsed, overcompensated
(i.e. a radicalizing effect is generated), or neutralized (i.e.
there is no effect)’.
Opp and Roehl (1990) theorized and empirically showed
that perceived repression not only has a direct negative
effect on political participation, but also an indirect positive
effect through ‘micro-mobilization processes’. For instance,
perceived repression may generate moral indignation and
social incentives to participate in protests (Goodwin et al.,
2004; Opp, 2009); or, it may both foster ideology and
increase the degree of embeddedness of individuals in polit-
ical networks and, in turn, radicalize political participation
(Loveman, 1998; McAdam, 1986, 1990). Consequently, the
variation of repression effects can be explained by weighing
the balance between the direct effect of perceived repres-
sion and indirect effects via micro-mobilization processes.
The earlier cited study of Ayanian and Tausch (2016) simi-
larly scrutinized how perceived risks associated with activism
– which we denote as ‘perceived repression’ – shapes partic-
ipation motivations and how those motivations, in turn,
influence one’s willingness to participate. In their view,
social-psychological factors (i.e. motivations) such as identifi-
cation, anger, and efficacy are thus, mediators between per-
ceived repression and political participation. Furthermore,
according to Ayanian and Tausch (2016), individuals’ risk
importance is dependent on these social-psychological fac-
tors.
We likewise argue that, like political participation, individ-
uals’ responses to repression can be influenced by micro-
mobilization processes. To investigate factors that influence
responses to repression, we should consider social-
psychological factors that encourage (or discourage) individ-
uals to resist repression and ignore possible threats. There-
fore, we will now discuss which social-psychological factors
may affect responses to repression and what the direction
of the effect would be. Social-psychological approaches to
protest generally argue that four fundamental reasons
explain why people take part in collective political action: in
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addition to grievances, with which ‘it all starts with’, we can
distinguish instrumentality, identity, and emotions – in par-
ticular group-based anger (Klandermans, 2015, p. 219).
Earlier, classical social psychological approaches to politi-
cal participation underline the role of grievances. Applying
the frustration-aggression mechanism, Gurr (1970) suggested
that ‘relative deprivation’ increases the intensity of grie-
vances, which may elicit anger and violent political activities
in societies. In fact, grievances can increase levels of political
participation indirectly through increasing the likelihood of
the choice of resisting repression. We therefore likewise
hypothesize that grievances can also directly influence
responses to repression.
Next, resource mobilization models and rational choice
theory stress instrumental motives and suggest that rational
individuals take part in political action if they believe that
their individual and/or group political action is likely to be
successful. Under repression, increasing perceived costs and
decreasing the likelihood of success can negatively influence
the feeling of efficacy of political actions, which, in turn,
decreases the likelihood of participation. Yet, on the con-
trary, if people see their own or group activities efficacious
– for instance, as a result of political opportunities (Meyer
and Staggenborg, 1996) – they may more often take the risk
of repression and respond to repression by not refraining
from political activity.
Social constructionist approaches reintroduced emotions,
and added identity and framing to social movement studies
in general and to the repression scholarship in particular.
They suggest that individuals’ political participation not only
depends on the weighing of (perceived) costs and (per-
ceived) benefits, and perceived efficacy, but also upon how
emotions are constructed, how individual and group identity
is shaped, and how circumstances and grievances are
framed. Emotions can both boost political participation and
contribute to the decline of social movements, depending
on whether more mobilizing emotions – either positive,
such as hope and joy, or negative, such as indignation and
anger (Jasper, 2011) – or demobilizing emotions – such as
fear and despair (Aminzade and McAdam, 2001) – prevail.
According to Goodwin and Pfaff (2001), the effect of repres-
sion depends on the effectiveness of management or miti-
gation of people’s fear. Fear can paralyze people in
response to repression, but anger can be the basis for mobi-
lization (Jasper, 1998) and for resisting repression. Hence,
we extend the earlier mentioned conceptual framework of
Ayanian and Tausch (2016) – which only includes ‘anger’ –
by including a demobilizing emotion (fear) and a positive
mobilizing emotion (hope).
Moreover, it is well established that identification with a
social category positively influences the likelihood of acting
for that very social group (Sturmer and Simon, 2004; Tajfel,
1981) and when the identification is politicized, the influ-
ence would be fostered (Simon and Klandermans, 2001).
There is also evidence that participation increases the politi-
cized collective identity (Klandermans et al., 2002). In fact,
politicized identification and activism are interrelated (Curtin
et al., 2016). Thus, we assume that, among people who
support a social movement, (de)mobilizing emotions and
self-identification as an activist may influence the choice
between refraining and resisting.
To sum up, as four key social-psychological factors, in this
study, we focus on grievances, perceived efficacy, emotions
(anger, hope, and fear) and identification (see Figure 1 for
the conceptual model). Thus, we formulate the following
hypothesis as an attempt to integrate responses to repres-
sion into a social psychological theory of political participa-
tion in repressive contexts:
Hypothesis 4 a–d: The higher the level of grievances, per-
ceived efficacy, mobilizing [demobilizing] emotions and identifi-
cation, the more [less] willing they are to embrace risks of
potential threats associated with engagement in activities (i.e.
they resist repression).
Hypothesis 5 a–d: The higher the level of grievances, per-
ceived efficacy, mobilizing [demobilizing] emotions and identifi-
cation, the more [less] often individuals participate in political
activities.
3. Methods and data3
Conducting research on sensitive topics in ‘authoritarian
fields’ is challenging (Glasius et al., 2018). In Iran, too, inde-
pendent academic surveying on certain topics, for example,
protests, political prisoners and opposition groups, is hardly
possible. Research in such settings is ‘by its nature extraordi-
nary and requires extra measures of effort and patience on
the part of the researcher’ (Malekzadeh, 2016, p. 865). The
first author collected the data and made every effort to over-
come barriers and gather reliable and valid data by relying
on his own knowledge of the social context, a large, trust-
worthy network of political activists, and ample experience of
political activism in Iran. Online questionnaires were used to
ensure that respondents could participate anonymously,
which makes preference falsification less likely (Farrell, 2012).
Our target group is IGM supporters. We define them as
those who take a positive stance toward the movement.
They form the ‘mobilization potential’ of the movement
(Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). To reach IGM supporters,
the first author relied on the same online networks and
means that are usually used for mobilization. Hence, he
replicated mobilization attempts of the IGM to recruit
respondents. Key activists, bloggers, and administrators of
well-known Facebook pages were asked to distribute the
online questionnaire. To assure respondents that participa-
tion would be safe, they used some encouraging and trust-
ing words. All in all, several influential activists were
involved in distributing the questionnaire. The questionnaire
was also advertised on one of the most influential IGM web-
sites (IranGreenVoice.com).
The online survey was conducted in three waves in 2013:
in February (W1), April (W2), and June (W3). In W1, respon-
dents were asked to write down their e-mail addresses to
track them for later waves. Of the 1051 respondents who
completed the survey, 502 provided their e-mail addresses.
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In the subsequent two waves, the survey was sent again to
them. About 40 per cent participated again in both the sec-
ond and third waves. Moreover, in the last wave, shortly
after the presidential elections in June 2013, the question-
naire was also distributed in a similar way as the first wave.
In total, 1050 participants completed this survey. Including
only eligible respondents of 18 years and older and exclud-
ing respondents living outside Iran, yields the following
three datasets: W1 (N = 743), W3 (N = 732), and the panel
data (N = 153).
The sampling strategy appears appropriate for our
research purpose. We not only build trust among respon-
dents, since about half of the initial sample provided us
their e-mail addresses, but we also reached IGM supporters
successfully. The past electoral behavior and engagement in
IGM activities, as well as demographics of respondents,
show the similarities of the sample group and IGM support-
ers.
4. Measures
Political participation (offline/online) was measured by the fol-
lowing question: ‘during the previous two months, how
often did you participate in any of the following offline/on-
line activities?’, whereupon 21 and 16 activities, respectively,
were presented for off- and online participation, respec-
tively. Both off- and online activities were measured on a
scale ranging from 1 (‘never’) to 5 (‘very often’).
To identify clusters of political participation, we employed
factor analyses. These analyses revealed, respectively, four
and three distinct dimensions within off- and online acti-
vism, which are conceptually distinguishable as well. Eventu-
ally, the fourth type of offline activities is excluded from
further analyses, because this cluster includes low-frequency
activities that were mostly employed in the midst of the
2009 protests, for instance, shouting ‘Allah Akbar’ from the
rooftops. The identified clusters with some exemplary items
are shown in Table 1 (For details of all analyses and descrip-
tive statistics, see Honari, 2019).
Everyday forms of resistance (off- and online) refers to par-
ticipation in some forms of political engagement that are
not visible or public, but are nevertheless widespread, in
particular in non-democratic societies (Bayat, 2013; Press,
2015). Chatting or off- and online elite formal activities
require some level of skills and experiences in formal politi-
cal activism. These are mainly overt activities. Next, the clus-
ter including informal, non-institutionalized activities suitable
for grassroots was labeled grassroots informal activities.
Internet-based (online) participation with high threshold was
coined by van Laer and van Aelst (2010, p. 1157) referring
to ‘actions that are made possible largely or totally thanks
to the Internet, but demand more resources than signing a
petition or sending an email’.
To measure perceived repression of off- and online activi-
ties, respondents were asked: ‘How likely do you think it is
that people who are politically active offline/online will face
the following threats?’ This question was followed by several
threats such as ‘Being arrested or detained’, ‘Being hurt by
security forces’ and ‘Getting problems on the job or at uni-
versity’ for offline repression and ‘Having their identities
exposed against their wishes’, ‘Having their websites hacked
or attacked’ and ‘Having their emails intercepted or data
stolen’ for online repression (For all items, see Honari, 2019).
Answers for each item varied from ‘very unlikely’ (1) to ‘very
likely’ (5). Perceived repression is the average of six items of
threats for offline activities (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.94 W1 and
0.94 W3) and ten items for online activities (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.90 W1 and 0.92 W3).
To measure response to repression, we used the respon-
dents’ answers to the question ‘How often, over the previ-
ous two months, did you refrain from aforementioned
offline activities because you faced potential threats? (1
Never; 2 Rarely; 3 Sometimes; 4 Often; 5 All of the Time).
The answer ‘Never’ to this question reflects a strong willing-
ness to take more risks and resist repression, whereas the
answer ‘All of the Time’ means the inclination to refrain.
To measure perceived efficacy of offline and online activi-
ties, we used two items tapping into two different dimensions:
individual efficacy (‘To what extent do you think that your own
participation in offline/online activities contributes to the solu-
tion of political problems in Iran?’) and group efficacy (‘To what
extent do you think that offline/online activities contributes to
the solution of political problems in Iran?’). The answer cate-
gories ranged from ‘not at all’ (1) to ‘very much’ (5).
To measure emotions, respondents were asked how they
felt when thinking about the situation in Iran. We included
Figure 1. Summarizes the hypotheses and illustrates the conceptual model
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both mobilizing and demobilizing emotions. With regards to
the former, both a ‘negative emotion’ (anger) and ‘positive
emotion’ (hope) were selected. With regard to the latter,
one ‘negative emotion’ (fear) was selected.
To assess grievances, we asked respondents: ‘How satisfied
are you with the following issues in Iran?’ (1, very dissatis-
fied, to 5, very satisfied), whereupon the following issues
were presented: social, political, economic, cultural, interna-
tional situation, and status of religion in society. A principal
component analysis (PCA) was conducted on the six items,
which showed that they tap one single dimension. Subse-
quently, the scores were reversed and a mean grievances
scale was constructed (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.84).
To tap into identity, we focused on activist politicized iden-
tity, the self-definition of an individual in terms of personal
political attributes. This is operationalized as follows: ‘Some
people define themselves as a political, social or human
rights etc. activist, others do not. To what extent do you
define yourself as an activist?’ (‘not at all’, ‘not very much’,
‘somewhat’, ‘quite’ and ‘very much’).
5. Results
5.1. Panel analysis: Investigating changes
How to explain political participation under severe and con-
stant perceived repression? To answer this question, we car-
ried out panel analyses and cross-sectional analyses. First,
using the panel data, we examined changes in IGM support-
ers’ perceived repression and their off- and online political
participation between the three time periods (February, April,
and June 2013). Table 2 reveals that there are no significant
changes in the mean levels of perceived repression, neither
off- nor online. This finding is aligned with the theoretical
argument discussed above that scholars should distinguish
‘objective’ repression – what states do – from ‘subjective’
repression – what individuals perceive (Kurzman, 1996; Wilt-
fang and McAdam, 1991). While some observers may argue
that the government loosens restrictions on oppositional
activities run-up to the elections, the findings show that peo-
ple may not perceive this policy change accordingly.
In contrast, the intensity of political participation of the
respondents varied in the same period. In February–April,
there were neither signals that the government intended to
hold fair elections (Rieffer-Flanagan, 2013; Rivetti, 2013), nor
societal signals of enthusiasm to participate in the elections.
Therefore, from April to February political participation of
respondents decreased significantly. However, in late March,
a group of young IGM activists urged Khatami to run in the
upcoming presidential elections. They believed that a candi-
date with a strong appeal could convince people to vote
and reunite the movement factions into one tactic. This trig-
gered the consequent mobilizations (Honari, 2019). Similarly,
the data show that between April and June political partici-
pation of IGM supporters increased. Interestingly, IGM sup-
porters’ responses to repression also significantly changed
during this last period, the two months prior to the elec-
tions. In fact, while the level of perceived repression is
stable, our respondents apparently attached less importance
to repression over time, both for potential threats because
of off- and online participation.
We zoom in on the period that political activism flared up
(April–June 2013, or T2–T3). Hence, we examine the data
gathered immediately after the 2013 elections, in which
respondents reported their activities over the previous two
months, covering the last weeks of the electoral campaign.
To do this, we used the larger dataset T3 (N = 719).
Let us first look at whether differences in IGM supporters’
inclination to refrain from political activities because of
potential threats (i.e. all the time, sometimes, often, rarely,
Table 1. Dimensions of political participation
Mode Label Three exemplary items
#
items alpha
Offline Everyday forms of
resistance (EFR)
‘Tried to change somebody’s mind about social-political issues by talking face-to-face’,
‘Encouraged somebody to attend social-political event or support political activities by




‘Participated in unauthorized street demonstration/rally/march’, ‘Attended a funeral
gathering staged by political groups’, ‘Signed a petition or open letter’.
6 0.79
Elite formal (EF) ‘Attended a political meeting/talk/gathering’, ‘Contacted a politician, government or
local government official’, ‘Financially or non-financially supported political prisoners’
family’
5 0.70
Online Everyday forms of
resistance (EFR)
‘Tried to change somebody’s mind about social-political issues by using the Internet
(chatting or commenting)’, ‘Shared political posts in online social networks such as
Facebook plus etc.’, ‘Uploaded a photo or video for political purposes’
8 0.89
High-threshold (HT) Hacked a website or an e-mail address for political purposes’, ‘Participated in a block




‘Sent an e-mail to politicians’ political websites or officials’, ‘Created a Facebook page,
YouTube channel, blog etc. for political purposes’, ‘Attended an online political
meeting (Paltalk Skype or Webinar).’
5 0.73
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and never) are related to demographic factors, such as age
and gender. Before we test our hypotheses, we briefly dis-
cuss the descriptive statistics and the result of one-way
ANOVA tests, as shown in Tables 3 and 4. These tables
demonstrate that there are no significant socio-
demographic differences between (almost all) categories of
responses to offline and online repression. Put differently,
IGM supporters’ gender, age, and education level cannot
account for why some of them were more inclined to
embrace the risks associated with engagement in political
activities than others.4
5.2. Cross-sectional analyses: testing hypotheses
To test our hypotheses, we used structural equation model-
ing employing STATA.5 We first focus on the direct effects of
perceived repression (H2) and social-psychological drivers
(H4) on individuals’ responses to repression. The findings
show that perceived repression is significantly associated
with responses to repression, for both off- and online activi-
ties (H2 supported): the greater individuals perceive repres-
sion, the more likely it is that they take account of potential
threats associated with activism. Moreover, the findings
show strong effects of both grievances and fear on response
to repression: IGM supporters who are less aggrieved and
more fearful are more strongly inclined to refrain from polit-
ical activities, be it online or offline, because of possible
threats (H4a and H4c partially supported). Perceived efficacy,
anger and hope, as well as politicized identity, do not signif-
icantly influence people’s response to repression, that is,
they do not affect IGM supporters’ willingness to take risks
associated with activism.
Subsequently, we test the direct effects of perceived
repression (H1), responses to repression (H3) and social-
psychological drivers (H5) on an individual’s degree of
political participation. It is apparent that there is no direct
effect of perceived repression on political participation (H1
is rejected), except for everyday forms of resistance
(online). Furthermore, the effect of the response to repres-
sion on political participation is significant for everyday
forms of resistance (H3 supported, but only for everyday
forms of resistance): supporters who indicated that possi-
ble threats often deterred them, indeed less often took
part in everyday forms of resistance, such as trying to
change someone’s mind during face-to-face or online con-
versations or encouraging others to attend political events.
Interestingly, individuals’ engagement in the other two
forms of political participations, including participating in
marches/demonstrations (GI: ‘grassroots informal’) and
contacting politicians (EF: ‘elite formal’), is neither affected
by perceptions of repression nor the willingness to take
risks.
Next, individual activist identity and individual efficacy
have direct effects on mostly all forms of off- and online
political participation (H5b and H5d supported): supporters
who define themselves as political activist and perceive their
own actions efficacious are more likely to participate in off-
and online political activities. Remarkably, grievances and
fear do not directly influence individuals’ engagement in dif-
ferent forms of political participation (H5a not supported).
Zooming in on mobilizing emotions, we find that while
hope enhances participation in everyday forms of online
and offline resistance, anger only increases high-threshold
online political participation and grassroots informal forms
of offline political participation (H5c partially supported).
Figures 2 and 3 compare the effects between different
clusters of offline and online political participation, respec-
tively. For the sake of clarity of the comparison, only one
box for political participation is shown. The arrows represent
significant relationships.
Focusing first on offline political participation, Figure 2
shows that identification as activist significantly influences
all three different clusters of participation, whereas grie-
vances, fear, and perceived repression do not have any
direct effect on people’s engagement in political participa-
tion.
Table 2. Overall means of the variables of three waves (February, April, and June 2013)
T1 Mean T2 Mean T3 Mean T1-T2 T1-T3 T2-T3
Repression
Perceived repression (Offline) 4.30 4.35 4.30
Perceived repression (Online) 3.91 3.90 3.92
Political Participation
Overall political participation (Offline) 1.52 1.39 1.62 *** ** ***
Everyday forms of resistance 1.50 1.39 1.59 **
Grassroots informal 1.43 1.24 1.69 ** ** ***
Elite formal 1.32 1.27 1.36
Overall political participation (Online) 1.95 1.77 2.08 *** ** ***
Everyday forms of resistance 2.51 2.23 2.71 ** + ***
High-threshold 1.22 1.19 1.23
Elite formal 1.50 1.39 1.59 **
Response to Repression
The importance of potential threats (Offline) 2.88 2.85 2.34 *** ***
The importance of potential threats (Online) 2.65 2.65 2.30 ** ***
Source: Panel Data (N = 153).
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Table 3. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) between different responses to offline repression and socio-demographics
All of the time Sometimes Often Rarely Never Total F Prob > F
Gender (Male = 1) 1.26 1.35 1.34 1.36 1.39 1.36 0.90
Age 30.08 31.90 30.45 31.11 31.41 31.08 0.96
Education 4.15 4.53 4.39 4.47 4.29 4.37 2.67 *
Political Interest 2.85 2.90 2.98 3.05 2.95 2.97 0.94
Frequency 65 93 151 164 246 719
Notes: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
Table 4. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) between different responses to online repression and socio-demographics
All of the time Sometimes Often Rarely Never Total F Prob > F
Gender (Male = 1) 1.36 1.32 1.32 1.35 1.39 1.36 0.64
Age 30.69 32.45 30.73 30.71 31.13 31.08 0.96
Education 4.34 4.34 4.53 4.28 4.34 4.37 1.72
Political Interest 2.87 2.82 3.02 3.03 2.97 2.97 12.97
Frequency 61 88 148 147 275 719
Figure 2. Comparison of significant effects between three clusters of offline political participationNote: Only significant effects are shown.
Single, double and triple lines represent one, two, and three significant effects, respectively.
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For online modes of political participation (Figure 3), we
observe almost the same similarities and differences among
clusters. Individuals’ responses to repression affects partici-
pation in everyday forms of resistance, and there are no
direct effects of feelings of fear and grievances on people’s
levels of participation. Only high-threshold online activism is
directly boosted by anger, while individual engagement in
the two other forms of participation is enhanced by other
motives such as individual efficacy, activist identity and
(partly) hope. As mentioned above, individuals who attach
more importance to the risks associated with activism (i.e.
they score higher on ‘responses to repression’) are signifi-
cantly less often engaged in everyday forms of online and
offline resistance, but it surprisingly does not affect the
levels of engagement in the four other clusters of political
participation. In fact, the mediation effect of response to
repression between fear, perceived repression and grie-
vances and political participation is only significant for
everyday forms of resistance. Therefore it is interesting to
zoom in on this particular cluster of political participation,
which we will do in the next section.
Finally, we turn our attention to indirect and total effects
on people’s participation in everyday forms resistance: our
causal model implies that both perceived repression and
social-psychological drivers affect participation indirectly,
mediated via responses to repression. Tables 5 and 6
present the direct, indirect and total effects of social-
psychological factors and perceived repression on everyday
forms of offline and online resistance. Concerning offline
political participation, our results show that perceived
repression has a negative indirect effect through individual
responses to repression. This means that IGM supporters
who perceive less repression are more strongly inclined to
embrace to the risks associated with activism, and in turn
more often politically active. The same conclusion holds for
online participation. However, online and offline participation
also differ in an important respect, namely: perceived
repression has a direct and total negative effect on online
participation, but not on offline participation.
Furthermore, our findings show that fear and grievances
have also indirect effects on everyday forms of online and
offline resistance: IGM supporters who are less fearful and
more aggrieved tend to attach less importance to potential
risks associated with activism, and are therefore more politi-
cally active.
We can summarize our findings in the three following
conclusions: first, perceived repression, grievances, and fear
influence people’s response to repression. Second, in gen-
eral, other social-psychological motives, including perceived
efficacy, activist identity and mobilizing emotions (hope and
anger), do not affect individuals’ response to repression.
And, finally, responses to repression, grievances, and fear
Figure 3. Comparison of significant effects between three clusters of online political participationNote: Only significant effects are shown.
Single, double and triple lines represent one, two, and three significant effects, respectively.
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play a mediating role between perceived repression and
individuals’ engagement in everyday forms of resistance.
6. Conclusions
The aim of this article was to examine political participation
of Iranian Green Movement supporters during the run-up to
the 2013 presidential elections. The last-minute boost of
electoral support for Rouhani in June 2013 largely resulted
from a boom in political engagement of IGM supporters
(Honari, 2019). To better account for this remarkable
increase in political participation, this article conceptualized
and integrated the notion of individuals’ choices in response
to repression in a social-psychological approach to explain-
ing social movement participation. Geographically speaking,
the social movement scholarship has predominantly focused
on Western Europe and the United States, countries in
which activists hardly face any substantial personal risks
(Ayanian and Tausch, 2016).
Our findings, first, revealed that the perceived level of
repression among IGM activists, on average, did not signifi-
cantly change during the six months leading up to the elec-
tion day, nor during the two months preceding the
elections on 14 June 2013. In contrast, IGM activists’
responses to this perceived constant level of repression sig-
nificantly changed during these two months (May–June
2013): possible threats less often steered IGM supporters
away from political activism. This resembles what (Kurzman,
2012, p. 377) summarized as ‘sudden prominence of brav-
ery’ during the Arab Spring – the increased readiness to
engage in risky protest, despite the unchanged severe levels
of repression.
Second, our analysis has shown that during the two
months prior to the elections, those IGM supporters who
were more fearful and perceived higher levels of repression
were more often discouraged to resist repression rather
than to refrain. Having more grievances had the opposite
effect: individuals who were more aggrieved were more
inclined to embrace the risks of potential threats. Remark-
ably, other emotions (anger and hope) and other social-
psychological participation motives (efficacy and identifica-
tion) did not affect people’s response to repression; thus,
these factors did not play a significant role in shaping how
people cope with potential threats associated with engage-
ment in political activities.
Regarding emotions, for most forms of participation, this
article reaffirmed that ‘anger is not likely to produce orga-
nized collective action’ (Aminzade and McAdam, 2001, p.
31). However, our findings showed that anger in fact con-
tributes to individuals’ engagement in some forms of politi-
cal participation, namely grassroots informal activities
(offline) and high-threshold online activities. We moreover
found that feelings of hope stimulate participation in every-
day forms of resistance, both online and offline.
The findings also showed that, in terms of the form of
political participation, IGM supporters’ responses to repres-
sion vary. Our distinction of different clusters of political
activism acknowledges that potential participants have a
variety of activities at their disposal and therefore, when
they decide to resist repression, they can choose from a
repertoire of political activities. In this regard, our analyses
indicate that increasing ‘bravery’ (not being deterred by
potential threats and/or harm) stimulates engagement in
everyday forms of resistance of IGM supporters, but not
other forms of political activities. These activities (such as
trying to change someone’s mind during face-to-face or
online conversations or encouraging others to attend politi-
cal events) entail lower risk, or their attendant risks are more
manageable, while they are crucial and important for social
movements in repressive contexts (Press, 2015). We presume
that this finding illustrates that social movement supporters
cannot only simply ignore risks and continue with the same
activity, as Ayanian and Tausch (2016) highlighted by expli-
cating the subjective importance of risk, but can also find,
choose or invent another, new form of political activity.
Table 6. Direct/Indirect/Total effects on everyday forms of













Grievances 0.132+ 0.031* 0.163*
Anger 0.035 0.000 0.036
Hope 0.101*** 0.001 0.102***
Fear 0.008 –0.021** –0.013







Notes: ***Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level.; **Correla-
tion is significant at the 0.01 level.; *Correlation is significant at
the 0.05 level.
Table 5. Direct/indirect/total effects on everyday forms of off-













Grievances 0.185 0.035* 0.221*
Anger 0.043 –0.005 0.038
Hope 0.109* 0.001 0.110*
Fear 0.006 –0.027* –0.020
Group efficacy (offline) 0.233*** 0.004 0.237***
Individual efficacy (offline) 0.183*** 0.007 0.190***
Activist politicized identity 0.320*** –0.008 0.312***
Notes: ***Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level.; **Correla-
tion is significant at the 0.01 level.; *Correlation is significant at
the 0.05 level.
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Individuals, indeed, can participate in non-public and unob-
trusive political actions whose risks are more manageable,
such as using face-to-face or online social networks to
change somebody’s mind or mobilizing others to support
political activities. This suggests that, in addition to risk-
taking, the capability of managing risk is also crucial for
resisting repression.
Regarding off- and online mode of political participation,
our findings underline earlier claim that the motivational
dynamics of off- and online activities differ (Brunsting and
Postmes, 2002). There is a notable difference in motivations
between off- and online activism. Remarkably, efficacy is not
related with offline activism. while it positively affects the
level in which people engage in online activities. Our find-
ings thus confirm the greater importance of perceived effi-
cacy in online activities. As several scholars have
emphasized (e.g. Lynch, 2011), online political activities have
increasingly become unfavourable because of the growing
practice of state repression on the Internet. Our results sug-
gest that in repressive contexts, choosing online activities
depends significantly on how social movement supporters
perceive the efficacy of online activities compared with the
efficacy of offline activities. The more activists deem online
participation efficacious, the more likely that they apparently
ignore repression or attach less importance to the risks asso-
ciated with repression.
Taken together, this article acknowledges that the effect
of repression on participation in a social movement (deter-
rence or escalation) is conditioned by two individual percep-
tions and decisions: whether one attaches much value on
risks associated with activism, and (if inclined to resisting
despite possible threats) in which form of political activity to
participate. These interconnected perceptions and decisions,
which can be conceptualized as an individual’s response to
repression, are influenced by social-psychological factors
such as fear, grievances and perceived repression.
The principal theoretical implication of this study is to
place choices of individuals into the theoretical explanation
of repression effects. This conclusion is less obvious as it
might seem: scholars have often hypothesized and investi-
gated macro-effects of state repression on individual partici-
pation, without accounting for the underlying micro-level
mechanisms; moreover, they have tended to lump a variety
of action forms together under the catchall label ‘participa-
tion’ (Ward, 2016). In most of the existing research on
repression, power and agency are largely attributed to
States, but not to social movements and individuals (Zwer-
man and Steinhoff, 2005). By shifting the attention from
state repression to individuals’ responses to repression, this
article speaks for an approach that goes beyond the victim-
ization of people toward seeing States and dissidents
equally as strategic actors having choices and agency (Zwer-
man & Steinhoff, 2005). Investigating the factors which
determine the individuals’ choices to respond to state
repression link macro to micro (Jasper, 2004; Meyer and
Staggenborg, 1996). It also provides a broader picture of
activities under repression and suggests paying more atten-
tion to activities that are not public and disruptive but
rather widespread and crucial, that is, such as everyday
forms of resistance and diverse strategies to manage the
risk of political participations.
This study is not without limitations. First of all, the speci-
fic context of this study prompts the question to what
extent our findings are generalizable to every instance of
social movement activity. We focused on the 2013 presiden-
tial electoral campaign period, when the primary goal of
IGM activities was influencing the election results (including
turnout). The approaching elections and the unfolding cam-
paign provided an important incentive for IGM supporters
to become more active again, despite an unchanged per-
ception of repressive threats from the state. This politicized
situation gives more room to some sorts of covert activities
that aim to mobilize or change relatives and friends’ minds
through trustful relationships. Politicization of society paves
the way to generate political discussions in personal net-
works (Opp and Gern, 1993). Nevertheless, in the cycle of
protests, the repertoire of political activities is more limited
to overt protest participation. In this case, ignoring repres-
sion and the risk-taking of an activity would matter more in
response to repression than managing risks and shifting
activities.
As we have already pointed out, the generalization of
findings to all Iranian opposition supporters should be made
with caution because of possible sample bias. In spite of its
limitations, the study certainly adds to our understanding of
the variation in political activities under severe repression
and draws our attention to a fruitful area for further work:
individual agency and responses to repression.
Notes
1. The role that Twitter itself played in the Iranian Green Movement is
questioned by several scholars. As Lynch (2011, p. 303), amongst
others, states, the role of Twitter for the organization and mobiliza-
tion of IGM has been ‘greatly exaggerated’ (for a detailed discussion
on Twitter use during IGM protests see: Honari 2015). Yet, the term
‘Twitter Revolution’ can be used to refer to the influential role of the
Internet and social networks in general.
2. For instance, see the debate in Radio Farda with the focal question:
“After almost three years, what has become known as the Green
Movement, does such a movement exist today?” https://www.radiofa
rda.com/a/f3_viewpoint_green_movement_iran/24610419.html
3. For more details about the research design and data, see Honari
2019 and online supplementary materials.
4. The only exception is educational level. Nevertheless, the post-hoc
test, pairwise comparison, using Bonferroni, Scheffe, and Sidak meth-
ods in Stata did not show any significant differences in the average
educational level between any pairs of groups.
5. The results for offline and online political participation, respectively,
are shown in Tables A3 and A4 in the online supplementary material
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